Page 39 - JDPA Volume 02, Issue 02

Journal of Defence & Policy Analysis Volume 02, Issue 02, December 2023

prominence in the 2000s. Strategic adoption of this approach by nations such as
Dubai, Switzerland, and France during this period aimed at cultivating a more
favourable global image.

Place branding practically refers to, the application of different marketing strat-
egies, in order to differentiate cities, regions and countries. What is important
here is, it is not an expensive media campaign because we are working on Nation
branding which is called reputation of the country. Reputation of the country is
not something that you can buy.

Nation branding is inherently policy-driven and operates on a long-term trajecto-
ry. While political perspectives often gravitate towards short-term gains within
a typical 5-6 year tenure, success in nation branding necessitates alignment with
overarching, long-term strategic plans that many countries inherently possess.

During the crisis period, particularly amidst the civil war in Sri Lanka in 2009,
the tourism sector consistently endeavored to assert a defensive stance, advo-
cating for the influx of visitors to the country. The primary contention revolved
around the assertion that the conflict was confined to the North and East regions.
Additionally, a secondary argument posited that individuals associated with the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) or any affiliated groups never specifi-
cally targeted tourists. This defense strategy was consistently articulated. How-
ever, upon retrospective examination, it becomes evident that while we aspired
to deem our efforts successful, the objective assessment reveals that our endeav-
ors did not attain the desired outcome. re write the above as an introduction

During the crisis period of the Sri Lankan civil war in 2009, the tourism sector
actively promoted the country as a safe destination. The primary argument was
that the conflict was localized to the North and East regions. Additionally, it was
emphasized that the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and affiliated
groups never specifically targeted tourists. This defensive stance was consistent-
ly maintained. However, in hindsight, it is clear that despite our aspirations, our
efforts did not achieve the desired outcome.

The inquiry into Sri Lanka’s lack of success suggests that amidst a global popula-
tion of 7.2 billion, individuals contend with approximately 200 daily messages.
Despite the axiom to refrain from judging a book by its cover, time constraints
lead many to succumb to such judgments. The pervasive challenge lies in the lim-
ited capacity for people to comprehend the intricacies and risks associated with
events in foreign nations. This phenomenon, often termed perception, regrettably
usurps the status of reality in public discourse. For the last 15 years, our research
has looked into this. We identify perception as the delayed reality. When people
stick to their first impressions, they find it hard to change their minds over time
and will continue with the same perception. The divergent responses to a bomb
blast occurring in the United States as opposed to Colombo can be attributed to

Faculty of Defence and Strategic Studies, General Sir John Kotelawala Defence University, Sri Lanka
29